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GRAND JURY DISCRIMINATION
CHALLENGES: DEFEAT BY DEFAULT
MARTHA STONE*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The sixth amendment guarantee to assistance of counsel is
among those constitutional rights "so basic to a fair trial that their
infraction can never be treated as harmless error."1 Protection of
this right, however, requires more than the mere presence of an
attorney who stands mute beside a criminal defendant when he ap
pears in court to face the charges against him. Absent active partic
ipation and aggressive advocacy by a defendant's legal representa
tive, any benefit derived from the right to counsel is meaningle~s.
Thus, the United States Supreme Court has emphasized repeatedly
, " 'that the right to counsel necessarily implies the right to effective
, ,
assistance of counsel. 2
, '" iq. re~pons~ to this admonition, conscientious criminal defense
attorneys vigorously fulfill their professional obligations by filing a
prolific display of pretnal motions to protect their clients' rights.
Legal motions seeking discovery, reduction of bail, competency' de
terminations, suppression of tangible evidence, statements, and
identifications appear with regularity. Because the judiciary has
been far from reluctant to chastise defense attorneys' poor perform
ances in these areas, 3 those lawyers who suffer from lack of initia
tive or knowledge are put on notice of the type of representation to
which they must aspire. Thus, in many instances, judicial expecta
tions have defined the parameters of effective representation.
Conspicuously absent from the avalanche of motions filed by
criminal defense attorneys are those that challenge the grand jury
* B.A., Wheaton College; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; Legal Di
rector, Connecticut Civil Liberties Union, Hartford, Connecticut. The author grate
fully acknowledges the assistance of Alan Gelfand, Department of Statistics, Univer
sity of Connecticut at Storrs, and the assistance of Samuel Chemiak.
1. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967).
2. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S.
258 (1973); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
3. See United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 223 n.ll (D.C. Cir. 1979); Coles
v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir. 1968); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUS
TICE § 3.6(a) (1978).
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panel on the ground that the selection process systematically ex
cludes members of a particular race or ethnic background in viola
tion of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to
the United States Constitution. While it is true that in some areas
of the country grounds upon which to challenge the grand jury are
almost nonexistent,4 the dearth of such motions on the part of even
the best criminal defense attorneys is puzzling. 5
One logical explanation is the misconception held by many de
fense attorneys that such grand jury challenges are difficult, expen
sive, or too time consuming to warrant their attention. 6 Others feel
that such attempts are hopeless in light of the United States Su
preme Court's 1976 decision in Washington v. Davis,7 which inter
posed an intent requirement onto equal protection claims. Cyni
cism has led some defense lawyers to believe that challenges really
do nothing to change the inherently suspect nature of the selection
process. 8 Still other attorneys base their failure to act upon an er
roneous impression that their clients lack standing to raise such
challenges 9 or that the statistical disparities present in their cases
4. For instance, in Washington, D.C., where the Public Defenders Office is
known for its rigorous advocacy, the procurement of racial balance on the jury, grand
or petit, has never been a major problem. This is primarily due to the large minOrity
population and the selection system utilized. See OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DE
FENDER, REP. ON CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVo IN D.C. (Austern-Rezneck Rep., Apr.
1975). In contrast, in places like Connecticut, where minority representation on
grand juries is sadly scarce, such claims have been litigated in only three reported
decisions. See State v. Villafane, 164 Conn. 637, 325 A.2d 251 (1973); State v. Cobbs,
164 Conn. 402, 324 A.2d 234 (1973); State v. Kemp, 126 Conn. 60, 9 A.2d 63 (1939).
5.. This is particularly true since, according to a nationwide survey of the selec
tion methods used to choose grand jurors, at least 22 states employ some form of dis
cretionary method. See J . VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES App. B, at
264-70 (1977).
6. The images conjured up by the well-known cases of Jo-Ann Little, Angela
Davis, the Harrisburg Eight, John Mitchell, and Maurice Stans do little to refute this
conclusion. Moreover, the statistical evidence necessarily involved in such a chal
lenge often discourages attorneys with an aversion to mathematics.
7. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
8. Admittedly, it is disconcerting to note that despite the United States Su
preme Court's reversal of a Texas defendant's conviction because of the presence of
discrimination in the grand jury selection process, jury selection officers in Texas
continue to engage in discriminatory practices. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S.
482 (1977); Hernandez V. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282
(1950); Hill V. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Smith V. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
9. Many defense attorneys are unaware that nonminority defendants in certain
cases have standing to raise grand jury discrimination claims: standing is not de
pendent on membership in a suspect class. In the federal system, the courts do not
have to decide if the defendant "was in any way prejudiced by the wrongful exclu
sion or whether he was one of the excluded class" when he challenges the selection
process. Thiel V. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 225 (1946). See United States v.
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are too small to be significant. Since no court has yet decided that
failure to challenge the grand jury panel constitutes ineffective
assistance of counsel, attorneys have not been warned by the ju
diciary that such a challenge is necessary to conduct an adequate
defense.
It is to those who cry futility, plead poverty, or avow inexperi
ence that this article is addressed. The myth that challenges to the
grand jury array are to be pursued by rich defendants represented
by experienced and well-seasoned defense attorneys must be eradi
cated. 10 The belief that Davis and its progeny undermine discrimi
nation claims and impose a legal barrier to their successful pursuit
is a falsehood. Although compiling a statistical analysis sufficient to
constitute a prima facie case of discrimination appears to be a com
plex and confusing procedure, it is not such an overwhelmingly dif
ficult task that an attorney should be excused from his obligation to
present such a claim. Moreover, as will be discussed, use of a par
ticular statistical model can result in successful challenges even
when the statistical disparities are small. l l
Zirpolo, 450 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Kuhn, 441 F.2d 179 (5th Cir.
1971); United States v. Leonetti, 291 F. Supp. 461 (S.D.N .Y. 1968). It does not matter
whether the challenge is based upon a federal statute, the supervisory power of the
federal courts, or the Constitution. See United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 567 n.2
(1st Cir. 1970).
Similarly, defendants in state courts can challenge grand jury composition re
gardless of their membership in the excluded class. See, e.g., Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S.
493 (1972). In Peters, a white defendant successfully challenged the state's system of
excluding blacks from the grand jury. Although the challenge was based on equal
protection as well as due process theories, the Court chose to ground its decision
only upon the latter clause. The analytical scheme to be applied remains the same,
however, when such a challenge is brought on the ground of equal protection. [d.
See also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (a male may bring suit for system
atic exemption for females).
Affirmative action suits also can be brought in federal court regardless of
whether the named plaintiff is a member of the underrepresented group. See Turner
v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Greene County, 396 U.S.
320 (1970).
10. As this article will attempt to show, challenges to the array are not as com
plicated as the literature on the subject indicates. Although much of such" literature is
thorough and well written, the authors tend to overemphasize the scope of the project
and the burden such challenges will entail. See, e.g., A. GINGER, JURY SELECTION IN
CRIMINAL TRIALS (1975). Contrary to Ginger's outlook, it is not essential to mount a
defense committee or team to perform multitudinous tasks. Id. at 102. See also
Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury Discrimina
tion Cases, 80 HARV. L. REV. 338 (1966).
Perhaps the most difficult task is to gain an understanding of the statistical data.
Once that has been mastered, it is relatively easy to raise a grand jury challenge. See
text accompanying notes 65-66 infra.
II. This article will attempt to refute the theory that grand jury challenges are
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In many states, criminal defendants are indicted day after day
by grand juries chosen through a selection method that substan
tially underrepresents racial, ethnic, and other cognizable groups
present in the population. 12 Thus, an onslaught of discrimination
challenges at the pretrial stage 13 is crucial to ensure that criminal
defendants will receive maximum protection of their constitutional
rights and the best possible defense to the charges brought against
them. 14
The absence of "ineffective assistance of counsel" claims
brought by defendants for failure to file discrimination challenges
should not signify that lawyers are free to abandon such challenges
with impunity. Clearly, under any definition of effective assistance,
such challenges must be made. 15 Only a barrage of claims ,will
fruitless when a small minority population is the target of discrim'ination. See ~irys,
Kadane & Lehoczyk,Jury Representativeness: A Mandate for M~ltiple Sotirc'e Lists,'
65 CALIF. L. REV. 776; 778 (1977).
',
"
"
12. For ,a general discussion of 'the prevalence of this 'significant' undei- ,
representation, see ]. VAN DYKE, supra note 5, at 28-35~
, '
"
, ' ,',
, 13. Although the Court in'Rose v. Mitchell, 443 l/.S. 545'(1979),' recently deter~
, IIlined that its decision in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), did not eliminate the '
federal court as a proper foru~ i~~ state' ~riminaI d~fendants to raise j~ry',discrimina~
tion Claims, the CO!-lrt nonetheles~ did not retreat from its position' t~atgrandjufY,'
'challenges must be made according to the state's criminal procedure law. See
Francis v. Henderson, 425 'U.S. 536 (1976) (in the absence ofcaus'e for failure to
, challenge and in the absence' of actual prejudice, a state prisoner who failed to make
a timely 'challenge to grand jury composition could not raise the issue in a post
conviction federal habeas corpus action); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973)
(in the absence of a showing of incompetent advice of counsel, a guilty plea entered
upon advice of counsel in a state prosecution precluded habeas corpus relief for ra
cial discrimination in selection of the grand jury).
14. Although this article deals primarily with challenges to the "key-man" se
lection system, where by the source of the names and the method of selection is
controlled by a single individual, challenges to other types of selection devices are
possible. Consider, for example, the challenges to the judicial selection system in
California, the jury commission system in Louisiana, and the judge selection and in
terview system in Pennsylvania, described by A. GINGER, supra note 10, at 108-15.
In NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES: A MANUAL FOR
LAWYERS, LEGAL WORKERS AND SOCIAL SCIENTISTS (B. Bonora & E. Krauss ed.
1979) the editors distinguished four types of challenges: Those based on source of
names, method of selection, composition of the pool, and violation of statutory proce
dures or standards. Also, grand jurors chosen pursuant to the Federal Jury Selection
and Service Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1976), may be subject to constitutional attack. See
Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.2d 805, 814 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d
564, 568 n.7 (1st Cir. 1970); United States v. DiTomasso, 405 F.2d 385, 391 (4th Cir.
1968); Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34, 50 (5th Cir. 1966).
15. One of the most exhaustive judicial treatments of ineffective assistance of
counsel claims can be found in United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir.
1979). See A. GINGER, supra note 10, at 92, in which the author suggests that the fail
ure of attorneys to at least consider the legal and factual bases for a grand jury' chal
lenge may constitute malpractice.

'I,
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make the courts realize that grand jury challenges are as integral to
an adequate defense as the numerous other pretrial motions
routinely filed on behalf of criminal defendants.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Over one hundred years have passed since the United States
Supreme Court first held that a criminal conviction could not be .
sustained if it was procured from juries, either grand or petit, from
which an identifiable class has been systematically excluded. 16 Not
once during these years has the Court retreated from this stalwart
position. 17
These principles compel the conclusion that a State cannot, con
sistent with due process, subject a defendant to indictment or
trial by a jury that has been selected in an arbitrary and discrim
inatory manner, in violation of the Constitution and laws of the
United States. Illegal and unconstitutional jury selection proce
dures cast doubt on the integrity of the whole judicial process.
They create the appearance of bias in the decision of individual
cases, and they increase the risk of actual bi~ as well. 18

In order to dispel the possibility of prejudicial taint, the Court
has insisted that "the jury be a body truly representative of the
community."19 This mandate does not mean, however, that each
individual jury must mirror the exact population of the commu
nity.2o As long as the selection procedures protect members of an
identifiable class from being substaritially underrepresented in the
grand jury array, the jury will not be invalidated. 21 To survive con
stitutional attack, both grand and petit juries must meet the same
stringent standard. 22
16. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303 (1879).
17. See Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S.
482 (1977); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); Coleman v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 22
(1967); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128
(1940); Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904).
18. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502-03 (1972).
19. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940). See also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522, 527 (1975); Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320, 330
(1970); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 225 (1946).
20. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208 (1965); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., ,
328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946).
21. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977). As the Court in
Castaneda made clear, even. if a system is constitutional on its face, it may still be
susceptible to abuse, rendering its use unconstitutional. Id. at 497.
22. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 628 (1972); Carter v. Jury Comm'n of
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Although a defendant cannot demand that members of his race
be included on the grand jury that indicts him, "he is entitled to
require that the State not deliberately and systematically deny to
members of his race the right to participate as jurors in the admin
istration of justice. "23 Whether purposeful discrimination leads to
total exclusion or merely substantial underrepresentation of minor
ity groups on the jury, it rises to the level of a severe constitutional
violation. 24

III.

ANALYSIS OF CASTANEDA TEST AND ITS APPLICATION
TO KEy-MAN GRAND JURY CHALLENGES

The United States Supreme Court recently devised a tripartite
test by which to determine whether equal protection violations
have occurred in a grand jury selection process. 25 Under the test,
enunciated in Castaneda v. Partida,26 it must be shown that a rec
ognizable and distinct class has been "singled out for different
treatment under the laws as written or as applied."27 "Second, the
degree of underrepresentation must be proved, by comparing the
proportion of the group in the total population to the proportion
called to serve as grand jurors, over a significant period of time. "28
Third, a grand jury selection process that is susceptible to abuse or
that is not racially neutral "supports the presumption of discrimina-

Greene County, 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479
(1954).
Even if there is no constitutional requirement that states institute prosecutions
by means of an indictment returned by a grand jury, Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.
516 (1884), if a state chooses to employ grand juries, it must comply with the dictates
of the fourteenth amendment when choosing those juries. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S.
545,557 n.7 (1979).

23. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 628-29 (1972). See also Cobbs v.
Robinson, 528 F.2d, 1331, 1334 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 947 (1976).
I
.
24. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 493 (1977); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S.
346,362-63 (1970). See also Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979). The earlier cases
involved absolute exclusion, while more recently the challenges have been based on
mere underrepresentation.
25. Although United States v. Rodriguez, 588 F.2d 1003, 1007 (5th Cir. 1979),
indicated that this was only a two-part test, the United States Supreme Court has
failed to-sustain any challenge in the absence of this third showing. See notes 88-90
infra and accompanying text.
26. 430 U.S. 482 (1977). The Supreme Court did not establish a new principle
of constitutional law in Castaneda. The Court merely distilled a succinct formula
which had already been expressed in various forms in its previous decisions. Id. at
494-95. See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 360 (1970); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356
U.S. 584, 587 (1958); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954).
27. 430 U.S. at 494-95.

28. Id.

"
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tion raised by the statistical showing. "29 Once a defendant has
shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, a substantial under
representation of his group that is not due to any random method
of selection, he has made out a prima facie case of discriminatory
purpose. The burden then shifts to the state to rebut the defend
ant's case. 30
A.

Proof of Cognizable Class: First Prong of the Castaneda Test

Although the early cases involving grand jury challenges raised
only racial discrimination claims,31 the litigation Beld gradually has
expanded to include other groups subject to discriminatory treat
ment. Hernandez v. Texas 32 settled whether discrimination on the
basis of ethnic identity in grand jury selection was as constitution
ally suspect as racial discrimination and as deserving of fourteenth
amendment protection. 33 The exclusion of women from grand jury
panels was found to violate constitutional mandates as early as
194634 and as recently as 1979. 35 Challenges also have been
mounted for exclusion based on age,36 religious belief,37 economic
status,38 or other background. 39
That the group involved may be small is of scant signm
29. [d.
30. See Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 565 (1979); 430 U.S. at 495.
31. Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 592 (1896); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370
(1880); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
32. 347 U.S. 475 (1954). See also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975);
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
33. 347 U.S. at 477-78.
34. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
35. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
36. See United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577 (10th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Olson, 473 F.2d 686 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 905 (1973); United States v.
Guzman, 468 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir. 1972), cen. denied, 410 U.S. 937 (1973). Generally,
such challenges have met with failure. But see United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564
(1st Cir. 1970).
37. United States v. Suskin, 450 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1971); People v. White, 43
Cal. 2d 740, 278 P.2d 9 (1954), cen. denied, White v. California, 350 U.S. 875 (1955);
Commonwealth v. Bastarache, 1980 Mass. App. Adv. Sh. 1729,409 N.E.2d 796.
38. See United States v. Tijerina, 446 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1971); Labat v.
Bennett, 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966).
39. The Court, in Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946), concluded
that any economic, social, religious, racial, political, and geographic groups of the
community could constitute a cognizable group. [d. at 225. See Carter v. Jury
Comm'n of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60 (1942); Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1966). For the speCific
problems inherent in each of these challenges, see Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.2d 805,
823 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 569 (1st Cir. 1970); A.
GINGER, supra note 10, at 168.
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cance. 40 In order to establish cognizability under Castaneda, it is
necessary to show that a class of persons has been "singled out for
different treatment under ·the laws, as written or as applied. "41 Al
though there must be more than a mere showing that the group
has similar characteristics, the burden to demonstrate the existence
of a cognizable class is reasonably easy to meet. Any evidence that
the community group is distinctive 42 in a way that would cause it
to be subjected to differential treatment may well fulfill this first
prong of the Castaneda test. "Whether such a group exists within a
community is a question of fact"43 that can be approached from
several different perspectives. 44 The presence of internal cohesion
constitutes strong evidence of an identifiable group whose interests
cannot be protected adequately by other members of the grand
jury pane1. 45 Alternatively, the attitude of the community can con
stitute sufficient proof of a cognizable class. 46
40. See, e.g., Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 287 (1950). In Foster v. Sparks, 506
F.2d 805, App. at 820 (5th Cir. 1975), Judge Gerwin, an independent author of the
appendix, suggests that courts obviate the need for proof of size by taking judicial
notice of cognizability.
41. 430 U.S. at 494. The scope of such challenges is in fact infinite. As the
Court acknowledged in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), "[c1ommunities dif
fer at different times and places. What is a fair cross section at one time or place is
not necessarily a fair cross section at another time or a different place." Id. at 537.
42. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. at 479.
43. [d. at 478.
44. See United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577 (10th Cir. 1976), in which the Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit developed its own test to determine the presence of
an identifiable class in a jury discrimination case:
[t1o establish cognizability, it is necessary to prove the following: (1) The
presence of some quality or attribute which 'defines and limits' the group;
(2) a cohesiveness of 'attitudes or ideas or experience' which distinguishes
the group from the general social milieu; and (3) a 'community of interest'
which may not be represented by other segments of society.
[d. at 591. See also United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 468
F.2d 1245 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937 (1973), for the application of a
similar test.
45. United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Guzman, 468 F.2d.1245, 1247 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937 (1973).
46. 347 U.S. at 479; Cobbs v. Robinson, 528 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 947 (1976). As the court explained in United States v. Potter, 552
F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1977):
[w1e must consider whether a particular class is in fact thought of as an iden
tifiable group by the larger community.... In assessing this factor, the fact
of prejudice or community discrimination against the group would clearly be
significant, ... because of its tendency to defeat the concept of an impartial
grand jury.
Id. at 905 (citations omitted). Thus, in Hernandez the Supreme Court based its af
firmative finding of cognizability on the following four factors: (a) The residents of
the community distinguished between whites and Mexican-Americans; (b) participa
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The actual evidence that must be presented to show that a
particular group has been singled out for differential treatment can
be derived from a number of sources. Attorneys commonly prove
cognizability by citing jury cases where the group in question al
ready has been recognized as a cognizable class and by urging the
judge to take notice of that statuS. 47
Government documents often can serve as indicators of sys
tematic discrimination. 48 The state's commission on human rights
or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission may collect
data and complaints that demonstrate a pattern of discriminatory
practices aimed at a particular groUp.49 The governor of a state
may have appointed a commission to address the problems of a
particular minority community. 50 Attorneys also can examine
whether the electronic media specifically addresses itself to the
group in question or whether special programs are conducted by
antipoverty, charitable, or civic organizations to serve the needs of
the purportedly excluded group. 51 Often, government agencies
~uch as the Department of Health and Human Resources under
take special language programs that are directed toward a particu
lar group.

tion of Mexican-Americans in business and community groups was marginal; (c)
Mexican-Americans attended segregated schools; and (d) Mexican-Americans were
confined to separate restaurant and toilet facilities. Id. at 479-80.
47. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. at 495. One can also pOint to voter regis
tration cases, such as Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), in which clearly
defined groups have been judicially recognized.
48. See e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE publications; U.S. COMM'N on CIV.
RTS., PUERTO RICANS IN THE UNITED STATES: AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE (Oct. 1976);
COUNTING THE FORGOTTEN (Apr. 1974); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS OF POPU
LATION (1970 & 1980). Documents issued by state health departments, city planning
agencies, and education departments also are helpful to demonstrate the existence of
a cognizable class.
49. Use of the state or federal freedom of information aCts can also be valuable
tools to prod government officials who may be reluctant to release any of these gov
ernment documents.
50. In Connecticut, for instance, the governor appointed a Council on Spanish
Speaking Opportunities. The proclamation establishing such a task force provides
valuable language which can be used to make a showing of cognizability. See CT.
DEP'T OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, REP. OF THE GOVERNOR'S COUNCIL ON SPANISH
SPEAKING OPPORTUNITIES (Mar. 1973).
51. See Villafane v. Manson, 504 F. Supp 78 (D. Conn. 1980), aII'd, 639 F.2d
770 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3912 (U.S. June 9, 1981), in which the
district court, in order to find that Puerto Ricans comprised a cognizable class, took
notice of Spanish radio station broadcasts and various programs aimed at Hispanics
which were run by an antipoverty agency, the Boy Scouts, and a charitable organiza
tion. Id. at 80 n.3.
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Proof of Substantial Underrepresentation: Second Prong of the
Castaneda Test

The second step in showing a violation of the equal protection
clause is demonstrating that members of the identifiable group
have been underrepresented substantially in grand juries over a
significant period of time. 52 Such underrepresentation is shown by
the "rule of exclusion."53 As the United States Supreme Court
stated in Castaneda, the degree of underrepresentation in a given
case is shown by comparing the proportion that the identifiable
group bears to the population of the area from which grand jurors
are chosen with the proportion that group bears to the total num
ber of those called to serve as grand jurors over a significant period
of time. 54 If such a statistical comparison reveals a substantial dis
crepancy between the group's proportion in the total population
and its proportion among grand jurors, that discrepancy gives rise
to a presumption that members of the group have been excluded
purposefully from membership on grand juries. 55 The requirement
that the showing be substantial must therefore be read as "substan
tial enough to justify an inference of impermissible discriminatory
motives. "56 The underlying need for this showing is derived from
the requirement of intent that recently has been superimposed

52. 430 U.S. at 494.
53. 430 U.S. at 492; Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); Eubanks v.
Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958); Hernandez v. Texas. 347 U.S. at 475.
54. 430 U.S. at 494; 347 U.S. at 480. In Castaneda, the Court facilitated the
showing for a prima facie case by requiring a comparison of figures representing the
number of minority members actually chosen to figures representing their proportion
in the total population. 430 U.S. at 494-96. See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625
(1972), in which the Court looked at the proportion of "eligible" blacks. Id. at '630.
Thus, concern with the eligible population comes into play only later in an attempt
to rebut the government's case. See text accompanying notes 105-14 infra. The
Court's rationale in Castaneda for this change in focus is not explained in the major
ity opinion. Chief Justice Burger, with whom Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined,
dissented, expressing bewilderment with the majority's conclusion. 430 U.S. at 504.
It is the author's view that the majority was correct in first examining gross popula
tion figures rather than eligible population figures. See United States ex rei.
Barksdale v. Blackburn, 610 F.2d 253, 262-64 (5th Cir.), rehearing granted, 616 F.2d
254 (5th Cir. 1980).
55. This presumption of purposeful exclusion is based on the reasoning that
"[ilf a disparity is sufficiently large, then it is unlikely that it is due solely to chance
or accident, and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, one must conclude that
racial or other class-related factors entered into the selection process." 430 U.S. at
494 n.13 (citations omitted).
56. See Villafane v. Manson, 504 F. Supp. 78, 82 (D. Conn. 1980), afI'd, 639
F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W..3912 (U.S. June 9, 1981).

1981]

JURY DISCRIMINATION CHALLENGES

675

onto equal protection challenges brought pursuant to the four
teenth amendment. 57
Until the United States Supreme Court decided Davis in
1976, persons who raised discrimination claims based upon the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment could win
their lawsuits merely by making a statistical showing that their par
ticular suspect class was underrepresented. 58 When the Court de
cided Davis, however, it complicated the showing by asserting that
"the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory
must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose. "59
Despite such an exhortation, as Justice Stevens acknowledged
in his concurring opinion in Davis, "[this] line between discrimina
tory purpose and diSCriminatory impact is not nearly as bright, and
perhaps not quite as critical, as the reader of the Court's opinion
might assume. "60 In fact, the Court's majority admits that, of ne
cessity, "an invidious diSCriminatory purpose may often be inferred
from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is
true, that the law bears more heavily on one race than another. "61
One year later, in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp., 62 the Court again emphasized that a
discriminatory purpose could be proven by either circumstantial or
direct evidence. The Court ·reasoned that "[s]ometimes a clear pat
tern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the
effect of the state action even when the governing legislation ap
pears neutral on its face,"63
Although the Court in Castaneda uneqUivocally extended the
Davis doctrine to claims alleging grand jury discrimination,64 it did
not impose a significantly greater burden upon criminal defendants
attempting to prove discriminatory intent. On the contrary, the
57. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979); Duren v.
Missouri, 439 U.s. 357, 368 n.26 (1979); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239.
58. See Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 461 (1972); Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 219 (1971); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil
Servo Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 1336 (2d Cir. 1973); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725,
732 (1st Cir. 1972); Chance V. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167, 1176 (2d Cir.
1972).
59. 426 U.S. at 240.
60. ld. at 254 (Stevens, 1-, concurring).
61. ld. at 242.
62. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
63. ld. at 266.
64. 430 U.S. at 493. "An official act is not unconstitutional solely because it has
a racially disproportionate impact." ld. (emphasis in original).
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Court has consistently singled out jury selection cases for differen
tial treabnent. Careful analysis reveals that the petitioners in jury
selection cases have been held to a far less stringent burden of
proof in showing diSCriminatory purpose than those who raise equal
protection claims in nonjury cases. 65
Because statistics alone may amount to circumstantial evidence
sufficient to satisfy the second prong of the Castaneda test,66 a
thorough understanding of the statistical approaches that can be
used to assess the significance of the disparities is crucial. It is usu
ally this portion of a grand jury challenge that is most disconcerting
to attorneys who profess inability to conduct mathematical analysis.
Because of an attorney's misconception that disparities in his case
are statistically insignificant, valid challenges may go unlitigated.
As will be discussed, however, the statistical evidence needed to
mount a successful jury challenge is relatively uncomplicated and
can be explained in terms that are comprehensible even to one not
versed in mathematical parlance.
There are four basic statistical models from which to choose,
each having its own pitfalls. The most traditional of these models is
the "absolute difference test," which requires subtracting the per-,
centage of minority group members on the venire or pool from the
percentage of the minority group members eligible for service. 67
Although this method generally is adequate to assess the under
representation of groups that comprise large parts of their respec
tive relevant populations,68 it is an inadequate method to assess
the underrepresentation of a group that is but a small part of the
relevant population. 69
65. In Davis, the Court held that "It is also not· infrequently true that the dis
criminatory impact-in the jury cases for example, the total or seriously dispropor
tionate exclusion of Negroes from jury venires-may for all practical purposes dem
onstrate unconstitutionality because in various circumstances the discrimination is
very difficult to explain on non-racial grounds." 426 U.S. at 242. See also Newman v.
Henderson, 539 F.2d 502, 505, rehearing denied, 544 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1976), cen.
denied, Maggio v. Newman, 433 U.S. 914 (1977).
66. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308-09 n.14
(1977). For instance, if Blacks comprised 30% of the. total population and 20% of the
eligible population, there would be an absolute disparity for Blacks of 10%.
67. See United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 589 n.12 (10th Cir. 1976).
68. See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. at
475, Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
69. By this measure, even total exclusion of a group comprising 2% of the eligi
ble population would result in underrepresentation of only 2%. This percentage dif
ferential is highly misleading. See Ross v. Wyrick, 581 F.2d 172 (8th Cir. 1978), in
which the court pointed out that when the underrepresented class constituted a
small percentage of the population, a small absolute percentage difference between
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A second approach examines the ratio or comparison between
the population of the group actually chosen for jury duty and the
proportion of the eligible population. Even if the purportedly ex
cluded group comprises a small percentage of the eligible popula
tion and an even smaller percentage of grand jurors chosen, there
can still be substantial underrepresentation but it might be over
looked because of the supposed statistical insignificance. 70
A third model focuses upon the actual number of grand jurors
excluded from the venire.71 Although such an approach may be ac
curate when dealing with a large group's representation in the pool
population, the smaller the group's representation, the more mis
leading it is to assess the significance of its underrepresentation by
calculating how many individuals have been excluded. 72 An addi
tional problem with this approach is that rather than testing for the
intent of the prosecuting state, which is the real focus in a grand

the class' proportion to the relevant population and its representation on grand juries
may be far more significant than a much higher absolute percentage difference in a
case in which the underrepresented class constituted a larger part of the population.
Id. at 175. See also Davis v. Dallas, 487 F. Supp. 389, 393 (N .D. Tex. 1980). Indeed,
the Fifth Circuit has emphasized that the only occasion on which consideration of
other statistical methods may be inappropriate is when the minority excluded ex
ceeds 10% of the population. See United States v. Butler, 615 F.2d 1066 rehearing en
bane denied 615 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1980).
70. If one applies the figures in the case of Villafane v. Manson, 504 F. Supp.
78 (D. Conn. 1980), affd, 639 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1980), eert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W.
3912 (U.S. June 9, 1981), when the excluded group comprises .93% of the eligible
population, and .27% of the grand jurors chosen, there is 71% underrepresentation.
This is calculated as follows:
100 x (1 - Proportion of group actually chosen)
Proportion of eligible population
71. See United States v. Kleifgen, 557 F.2d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1977). See also
United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577 (10th Cir. 1976); United States v. Goff, 509 F.2d
825 (5th Cir.), eerl. denied, 423 U.S. 857 (1973); United States v. Whitley, 491 F.2d
1248 (8th Cir.), eeTt. denied, 416 U.S. 990 (1974). Significantly, all these cases pre
ceded Castaneda.
72. This is best illustrated by the following example. Assuming that 1,000
grand jurors are chosen over a 10-year period, a group comprising 2% of the eligible
population but only 1% of grand jurors will have lost 10 individual places, or one per
year. A much larger group, comprising 40% of the eligible population, and
underrepresented on grand juries by the same one absolute percentage difference,
will have been selected 390 times instead of 400 tim~s. The number of individuals
excluded is again 10, or one per year. Although the number of individuals excluded
is the same in each case, the underrepresentation of the first group is probably not
due to chance. The underrepresentation of the second group, conversely, may well
be due to chance. This, of course, is the heart of the question. Purposeful exclusion
is presumed when a group's underrepresentation is not attributable to chance and is
not otherwise satisfactorily accounted for by the state.
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jury challenge, it is better designed to test for harm to the com
plaining defendant. 73
The statistical decision theory (SDT) is the most sophisticated
and precise of the four models and often can be used as a basis for
a successful challenge even when application of the other three
methods fails to produce significant disparities. Adopted for the
first time by the Supreme Court in Castaneda to measure the sig
nificance of the statistical disparities,74 it is the least understood of
the models and yet certainly the most effective. This method takes
into account not only the disparity between the group's representa
tion in the population and its representation among grand jurors
but, more importantly, the improbability that such a disparity
would have resulted from a racially and ethnically neutral random
selection process. 75 With such a test, one can "learn the probabil
73. See Villafane v. Manson, 504 F.2d F. Supp. 78, 83 (D. Conn. 1980), aff'd
639 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3912 (U.S. June 9, 1981).
74. Although the statistical decision theory [hereinafter referred to as SDTj was
first expounded upon by Finkelstein in his article, see note 10 supra, and was ac
knowledged as useful by the Court in Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 603 n.9
(1972) and Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 552 n.2 (196'1), it was not fully embraced
by the Court until its decision in Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. at 496 n.17. Since
that time it has been lauded as a "precise method of reasoning the significance of
statistical disparities" by the Court in Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433
U.S. 299, 308-09 n.14 (1977) and by other federal courts. See Board of Educ. of City
School Dist. of N.Y. v. Califano, 584 F.2d 576, 584 n.29 (2d Cir. 1978), affd sub.
nom., Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of N.Y. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130 (1979);
Villafane v. Manson, 504 F. Supp. 78, 81-82 (D. Conn. 1980), affd, 639 F.2d 770 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3912 (U.S. June 9, 1981); Guardians Ass'n of
N.Y. City Police Dep't v. Civil Servo Comm'n of N.Y., 484 F. Supp. 785, 793
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Caufield v. Board of Educ. of N.Y., 486 F. Supp. 862,902 (E.D.N.Y.
1979); Cooper V. University of Tex. at Dallas, 482 F. Supp. 187, 194 (N.D. Tex.
1979).
75. The method requires three steps. The first is to calculate the percentage
which the putatively excluded group would occupy on grand juries as the result of a
series of random selections of grand jurors. The second step is to compare this hypo
thetical result with the result of the selection decisions that were actually made. The
third step is to assess the significance of the difference between the expecte<;l and
the actual results. This is done by calculating the probability that the deviation from
the expected result is due to chance. Since the improbability that the actual result of
grand juror selection was due to chance is what gives rise to the presumption of pur
poseful exclusion, the final calculation needed to justify the presumption of purpose
ful exclusion, and thereby to make out a prima facie case of exclusion, must show the
following: for a sample of the given size, the deviation from the result that normally
would be expected from random selection is so great as to be incompatible with the
hypothesis that the selection was random. A probability of less than .05%, that is, a
chance of less than 1 in 20, is generally considered by statisticians to be small
enough to warrant rejection of the hypothesis of random selection, and, therefore,
can establish the presumption of purposeful discriminatory exclusion. See Villafane
v. Manson, 504 F. Supp. 78, 81-87 (D. Conn. 1980), affd, 639 F.2d 770 (2d Cir:
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ity that the observed value could have happened by chance, i. e.,
the probability that in a random sample of an appropriate test pop
ulation, the variable would exhibit a value as extreme as that ob
served. "76
The superiority of the fourth model over the three forms of
analysis traditionally applied in grand jury discrimination cases is
evident when analyzing the distinct advantages that it possesses
over the others.77 First, SDT allows a court to assess the signifi
cance of a given disparity between the proportion of a group's
membership in a grand jury and its proportion in the total popula
tion with the aid of a statistical probability theory. It predicts for
the court the likelihood that an event that appears extreme or un
likely would result from chance. While the other three methods
leave the court with no means to draw conclusions from the nu
merical calculations, SDT quantifies the likelihood that the discrep
ancy will occur, thus offering a reliable criterion through which to
interpret the significance of the differentials. 78
Second, SDT surpasses the other methods by being the only
one to take into account the size of the sample. Because the size of
the sample figures directly into the statistical calculations and be
cause the larger the sample the more confidence one has in the
data, it is clear that this method will result in more valid conclu
sions. 79
Perhaps most important, SDT is especially effective when the
putatively excluded group comprises only a small proportion of the

1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3912 (U.S. June 9, 1981); Davis v. Dallas, 483 F.
Supp. 54, 57 n.3 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Cooper v. University of Tex. at Dallas, 482 F.
Supp. 187, 194 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Finkelstein, supra note 10, at 359.
76. Cooper v. University of Tex. at Dallas, 482 F. Supp. 187, 194 (N.D. Tex.
1979).
77. For a thorough discussion of the "absolute difference test," the "ratio ap
proach," the "actual numbers approach," and their pitfalls, see Villafane v. Manson,
504 F. Supp. 78, afI'd, 639 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3912
(U.S. June 9, 1981). See also D. BALDUS & J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCmMI
NATION (1980); Kairys, Jury Selection: The Law, A Mathematical Method of Analy
sis and a Case Study, 10 CmM. L. REV. 771 (1972); Sperlich & Jasporic, Statistical
Decision Theory and the Selection of Grand Jurors: .Testing for Discrimination in a
Single Panel, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 75 (1975).
78. See, e.g., Davis v. Dallas, 487 F. Supp. 389, 393 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
79. See also Mitchell v. Rose, 570 F.2d 129 (6th Cir. 1978), rev'd, Rose v.
Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979). The Sixth Circuit noted the advantages of such a
method: "[i]n most reported cases thus far, this statistical analysis has been largely in
tuitive, based on rough impressions about probabilities. However, given accurate
data, the probability that racial results are due to chance can be analyzed mathemat
ically and either affirmed or rebutted with considerable accuracy." Id. at 133 nA.
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total population. When the underrepresented class constitutes a
small segment of the population, a small percentage differential be
tween its proportion in the total population and its proportion
among grand jury selections may be more meaningful than a far
larger percentage differential in a case where the underrepresented
class constitutes a larger percentage of the population. Again, SDT
furnishes a statistical tool to assist the court in making this determi
nation. 8o
The greatest pitfalls of SDT may be time and expense. A stat
istician must be employed to compute the information that will be
introduced into evidence. 81 H the issue is raised before trial in a
motion to quash, then the testimony or affidavit of this expert is
crucial to making a proper record. 82
Although the data analysis is relatively easy for a mathemati
cian, it is the data collection itself that often makes an attorney feel
helpless. The United States census is the best source of the total
population figures that are needed for part two of the Castaneda
test. 83 It is also necessary to ascertain the number of the putative
group actually chosen in order to calculate the group's representa
tion in the pool. Several methods can be utilized. If the cognizable
group in question consists of women or young people, often that
data is readily available on the jury questionnaire. 84 If the cogniza-'
ble group consists of Hispanics, a community leader of the His
panic community can be hired to go over the jurors' names and to

80. See Ross v. Wyrick, 581 F.2d 172, 174 n.6 (8th Cir. 1978); Villafane v.
Manson, 504 F. Supp. 78, 85 (D. Conn. 1980), aff'd, 639 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3912 (U.S. June 9, 1981).
81. Although resort to prior discrimination cases may be sufficient to prove
cognizability, it certainly is insufficient to show statistical disparity. See Rose v.
Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 572 n.12 (1979).
82. Rose v. Mitchell, id. at 545, provides an example of a record devoid of the
proper statistical proof. Because there was no evidence as to the total number of
foremen appointed by the judges in Tipton County during the critical period in
question, the Court found it impossible to determine if the statistical disparity was
significant enough to make out a case of discrimination under the rules of exclusion.
Id. at 571.
83. It should always be argued, however, that when dealing with minority
groups, the census may fail to give an accurate count, erring on the side of
undercounting. See U.S. COMM'N ON Crv. RTS., COUNTING THE FORGOTTEN, supra
note 48, at 2.
84. A motion for discovery may be needed to secure access to the jury selection
records. Although in Test v. United States, 420 U.S. 28 (1975), the unqualified right
to discovery and inspection of federal jury materials was based upon a statutory pro
vision, 28 U.S.C. § 1867(f) (1976), the reasoning is equally persuasive for obtaining
such discovery in state court challenges.
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identify members of that ethnic group.85 If blacks constitute the
cognizable class, the process of identification is somewhat more dif
ficult, especially in states where race is not recorded. In those
cases, an extensive telephone survey may be the only way to iden
tify a person's race. 86
Apart from requiring a witness to demonstrate the size of the
excluded group and selectivity inconsistent with randomness, no
other testimonial evidence is absolutely necessary.87 Since the cost
of hiring a witness should be commensurate with the amount of
time spent to complete the requested project, the expenses may
not be as inflated as anticipated. 88
C.

System Susceptible to Abuse: Castaneda's Third Prong?

According to Castaneda, a demonstration that the grand jury
selection procedure is "susceptible to abuse or'is not racially neu
tral"89 is necessary only to support the presumption of discrimina
tion raised by the statistical showing. Yet the Court has never
found discrimination amounting to a constitutional violation absent
proof of such subjectivity in the selection process. 90 What consti

85, On occasion, a person's ethnic identity is difficult to ascertain from the
spelling of his name. In those instances, a telephone survey can readily provide the
answer.
86. This task need not be too time-consuming or overwhelming. College or law
students often can be convinced to take on this project. Also, once an attorney gath
ers this data, which is usually not contested by the prosecution, another attorney can
readily utilize these same figures and merely build onto the base already begun.
Currently, information apparently is not traded. Cooperation would greatly facilitate
these challenges.
87. Although the elaborate list of experts mentioned by A. GINGER, supra note
10, at 185, would certainly be impressive to a court, any testimony elicited from
someone other than a statistician is mere surplusage.
88. In order to keep costs to a minimum, perhaps the most fruitful ground for
soliciting an affordable expert is a university or college in the area. Not only will a
university professor have the credentials to impress a court, but he may be con
vinced that such a project could be a worthwhile venture for the class which he
teaches, or be impressive on a resume. Thus, the professor may be persuaded to do
nate some of his time or at least work for a minimal rate. In most cases, since the de
fendants will be indigent, defense counsel may have to resort to motions for pay
ments of expert fees and rely on the in forma pauperis statutes.
89. 430 U.S. at 494.
90. See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 353-55 (1970); Sims v. Georgia, 389
U.S. 404,.407-08 (1967); Jones v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24, 25 (1967); Avery v. Georgia,
345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1934). See also Alexander
v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972), in which the Court relied not only upon the statis
tical improbability but also upon the racially biased selection procedures in order to
find a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 630. The converse has not been true,
however. The presence of minimal statistical disparity, or the total absence of dispar
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tutes a "substantial disparity" for statistical purposes has tended to
depend, in part, upon the mechanism causing the disparity. If it
proceeds from objective criteria, the disparity may be tolerable. If,
however, it results from the application of a subjective procedure
giving the selector wide opportunity to discriminate, the disparity
that will be tolerated diminishes. 91 Thus, in Castaneda the Court
examined the "highly subjective" selection system to buttress the
statistical proof of discrimination offered by the defendant. 92
Subjectivity can take various forms. Officials who select the
grand jury clearly have an affirmative duty to learn who is qualified
and to select individuals from all segments of society.93 When
these officials fail to take steps to acquaint themselves with eligible
members of a purportedly excluded population94 or fail to familiar
ize themselves with racially neutral selection procedures,95 they
have failed to meet their burden regardless of whether they con
sciously intended to discriminate. 96
Turner v. Fouche 97 demonstrates how the absence of a ran

ity, has not prevented the Court from finding purposeful discrimination. In Cassell v.
Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950), when despite the absence of any significant statistical
disparity, a prima facie case was proven by a demonstration that the jury commis
sioners selected jurors on the basis of their personal acquaintances, did not include
blacks, and made no effort to familiarize themselves with eligible voters. Id. at
287-88. See also Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 238 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dis
senting); Ross v. Wyrick, 581 F.2d 172, 175 (8th Cir. 1978), Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d
1, 22 n.40 (5th Cir. 1966). As the Court noted in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at
239, an inference of purposeful discrimination can arise from any probative evidenti
ary sources, including but not limited to statistics. See also Rose v. Mitchell, 443
U.S. 545, 592 (1979) (White, J., dissenting).
91. See Blackwell v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 443, 447 n.7 (4th Cir. 1973).
92. 430 U.S. at 497.
93. See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 370 (1970); Mitchell v. Rose, 570 F.2d
129,135 (6th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
94. See, e.g., Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 289 (1950); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S.
400, 404 (1942).
95. See, e.g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972); Whitus v.
Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 551-52 (1967); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559,562 (1953).
96. Courts repeatedly have emphasized that "officials who select grand jurors
must be considered to have intended the natural results which flow from their con
duct." Mitchell v. Rose, 570 F.2d 129, 135 (6th Cir. 1978), rev'd, Rose v. Mitchell,
443 U.S. 545 (1979); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559,562 (1953); Smith v. Texas, 311
U.S. 128, 132 (1940); Ross v. Wyrick, 581 F.2d 172, 175 (8th Cir. 1978). It is irrele
vant, therefore, that the motivation arises from a misconception that the law demands
token representation or that such effort was a manifestation of an intent not to dis
criminate. Such a practice still constitutes prima facie evidence of intentional dis
crimination. Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S.
128, 132 (1940); Ross v. Wyrick, 581 F.2d 172, 175 (8th Cir. 1978).
97. 396 U.S. 346 (1970).
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dom selection method proved fatal to the constitutional validity of a
grand jury selection system. The jury commissioners in Turner
pared the list themselves and purposefully eliminated blacks they
felt were unintelligent or of questionable character. The Court, in
holding that the underrepresentation warranted corrective action,
singled out the use of subjective judgment as one of the causes of
the impermissible disparity. 98
One of the most egregious discriminatory selection methods
occurs when there is purposeful inclusion of a certain class on the
grand jury. Thus, if the sheriff intentionally chooses a black grand
juror for the case of a black defendant,99 or a Hispanic grand juror
for the case of a Hispanic defendant,lOo the selection system is
invalid. 101
Offering proof of discriminatory action on the part of the se
lectors is not as difficult as it first appears. In key-man or jury com
mission selection systems, where one person or a committee se
lects jurors, it will be necessary to call the high sheriff or jury
commissioner to the witness stand on behalf of the defendant to
testifY at the pretrial hearing. The kind of discrimination in Turner
may not be easy to elicit due to a natural reluctance on the part of
the sheriff to admit that he purposely eliminated blacks he felt
were unintelligent or unscrupulous. 102 The kind of discriminatory
action found in Cassell v. Texas,103 however, may prove less bur
densome. The only testimony that need be offered under Cassell is
an admission by the sheriff or key-man that his failure to choose
particular members of the suspect class was not due to any con
scious decision on his part but merely due to his failure to know
any eligible persons in that group. Thus, he can admit to his lack
of knowledge without even realizing the constitutional deficiency of
his practice. The same kind of evidence can be elicited when the
98. See also Villafane v. Manson, 504 F. Supp. 78, 80 (D. Conn. 1980), afrd,
639 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3912 (U.S. June 9, 1981). His
panics comprised a significant and identifiable class; yet the sheriff failed to make
any effort whatsoever to acquaint himself with Hispanics or to add the names of His
panics to his source list. I d.
99. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 287 (1950).
100. Villafane v. Manson, 504 F. Supp. 78, 88 (D. Conn. 1980), afi'd, 639 F.2d
770 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3912 (U .S. June 9, 1981).
101. The Court in Cassell warned that inclusion is just as unconstitutional as
exclusion. 339 U.S. at 287.
102. It may indeed be the wiser course of action to refrain from interviewing
the selector prior to the hearing so he will not be alerted to the possible illegality of
his action.
103. 339 U.S. 282 (1950).
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sheriff or key-man uses·· a discriminatory selection method
consisting of the intentional matching of black jurors with black de
fendants. Often these selectors are eager to emphasize their efforts
to make such inclusions under the erroneous assumption that such
actions are meritorious. 104

D.

State's Rebuttal

Once a defendant has made out a prima facie case of substan
tial underrepresentation not caused by a random selection process,
the burden shifts to the state to rebut the defendant's claim. 105
The defendant's response to the state's rebuttal becomes the last
hurdle to overcome before a successful challenge can be sustained.
At least three avenues are available to the state in buttressing
its case. First, the state can argue that there was no purposeful ex
clusion or "intent to discriminate" against the putative class by the
person responsible for selection. lOG Simple protestation from a
commissioner that racial consideration played no part in the selec
tion process, however, already has been rejected by the United
States Supreme Court as insufficient evidence to rebut a defen
dant's prima facie· case. 107 "The result bespeaks discrimination,
whether or not it was a conscious decision on the part of any indi
vidual jury commissioner. "108 Nor can the fact that the official was
unacquainted with members of the excluded class excuse his con
duct. 109
Second, the state can point to recent efforts by the key-man or
jury commission to· correct the disproportionate representation of
104. See Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 132 (1940); Villafane v. Manson, 504 F.
Supp. 78 (D. Conn. 1980), afI'd, 639 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49
U.S.L.w. 3912 (U.S. June 9, 1981).
105. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. at 494-95.
106. See generally Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); Moore v. New York,
333 U.S. 565 (1948).
107. 430 U.S. at 498 n.19; Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972);
Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. at 361; Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. at 481-82; Glasser
v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 598 (1935).
See also Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 593 (1979) (White, J., dissenting), in which it
was suggested that a self-serving statement that the appointing authority had "noth
ing against" appointing blacks would be insufficient rebuttal. Id.
108. 347 U.S. at 482. See also Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1975).
"Ignorance of the inadequacy of selection procedures would be as reprehensible as
knowledge of such inadequacy and unwillingness to rectify." Id. at 823 (footnotes
omitted).
109. See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. at 360; Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545,
551-52 (1967); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. at 290 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Hill v.
Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 404 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 131-32 (1940).
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members of the cognizable class from the grand jury array.ll0
Whether this explanation will persuade a court depends upon how
successful the efforts have been. A halfhearted attempt by the
sheriff to comply with his affirmative duty may not excuse any sub
stantial disparity. 111
The state's third argument is the most damaging to the de
fendant's prima facie case. In many instances, the state can effec
tively rebut a defendant's challenge merely by showing that the
group is not underrepresented significantly in relation to the eligi
ble, as opposed to the total, population. 112 This rationale has been
used successfully to defeat grand jury challenges in a number of
federal and state jurisdictions. 113 Unfortunately, little can be done
to refute the numbers game if it is played accurately by the state.
The defense could argue that the United States Supreme Court has
yet to rule definitively on what disparity is Significant enough to
sustain a grand jury challenge, or that the statistical disparity re
sulting from use of eligible, as opposed to total, population figures,
though small, is still so overwhelming as to subject the selection to
constitutional attack. Efforts also should be taken to direct the
, ~ourt's focus from the statistics to the subjective selection process.
Even if the statistical disparity is small, the figures, coupled with
the opportunity to discriminate by the sheriff, can result in a find
ing of a constitutional violation. 114
IV. CONCLUSION
As is evident from the foregoing discussion, grand jury dis
crimination challenges are not overwhelmingly difficult to mount.
110. See Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945).
111. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was critical of this type of con
duct by the jury selection officials: "[tlhey must uncover the source of competent
jury prospects from all significantly identifiable elements of the community. Inno
cent ignorance is no excuse. It neither shields the jury's action-verdict or
indictment-from scrutiny, no does it justify the half-hearted, obviously incomplete
performance of duty by the officials." Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1, 12 (5th Cir. 1966).
112. See, e.g., United States v. Whitley, 491 F.2d 1248 (8th Cir. 1974); United
States ex. rei. Chestnut Criminal Court, 442 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1977).
113. To effectively rebut the defendant's prima facie case, the government's
proof must consist of mor~ than a mere assertion that the putative group is less quali
fied or less available than other groups. See, e.g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. at 346;
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. at 475; Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. at 282.
114. In fact, what constitutes a substantial disparity can depend in part upon
the mechanism causing the disparity. If it proceeds from objective criteria, the dis
parity may be tolerable, but "if the disparity proceeds from the application of subjec
tive tests, under which there is wide opportunity for intentional racial discrimina
tion, the tolerable disparity is diminished." Blackwell v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 443, 447
n.7 (4th Cir. 1973).
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The obvious obstacles of ignorance of the law, statistical inexperi
ence, and financial constraints are all sunnountable through initia
tive and creativity.
Tremendous benefits can be derived from a discrimination
challenge. At the pretrial stage a successful challenge will result in
dismissal of the indictment. 115 Even if a second indictment is
sought, evidence shows that the presence of even one minority
grand juror on the subsequent grand jury panel can change the
outcome. U6 At the post-trial stage, a grand jury challenge can fur
nish the basis for an appeal through the state court system and can
provide the basis for certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court. 117 In addition, federal habeas corpus relief remains a viable
option after exhaustion of state court remedies. 118
Indeed, aggressive advocacy demands that a grand jury chal
lenge be incorporated into the defense of criminal actions. The
challenge not only protects a criminal defendant from the unequal
administration of justice, but it assures the defendant, if convicted,
of an important issue to litigate on appeal. In addition to these
benefits, the grand jury challenge furthers other important public
interests. Perhaps the Supreme Court's recent warning best sum
marizes the evils of allowing a discriminatory grand jury selection
method to remain unchallenged:
[s]election of members of a grand jury because they are of one
race and not another destroys the appearance of justice and
thereby casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process. The
exclusion from grand jury service of Negroes, or any group oth
eIWise qualified to serve, impairs the confidence of the public in
the administration of justice. As this Court repeatedly has em
phasized, such discrimination "not only violates our Constitution
and the laws enacted under it but is at war with our basic con
cepts of a democratic society and a representative government."
. . . "The injury is not limited to the defendant-there is injury
to the jury system, to the law as an institution, to the commu
115. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556 (1979).
116. See A. GINGER, supra note 10, at 94; 24 LAWYERS GUILD PRACTITIONER
10 (1965).
117. See Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. at 282; Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942);
Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939).
118. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. at
482. For a discussion of the availability of federal habeas corpus relief as well as
other federal remedies, see Diamond, Federal Remedies for Racial Discrimination in
Grand Juror Selection, 16 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 85, 85-117 (1980).
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nity at large, and to the democratic ideal reflected in the pro
cesses of our courts. "119

Thus, the obligation of criminal defense attorneys to litigate such
challenges is compelling. Absent efforts by defense counsel, consti
tutional violations will escape judicial review.
119. Rose Y. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555-56 (1979), (quoting from, in part,
Ballard Y. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946) and Smith Y. Texas, 311 U.S. 128,
130 (1940)).

